Those of us who study telecommunications are fortunate to live in very interesting times. The emergence of new network technologies and advances in our understanding of the economics and politics of regulation have opened up the policy space in ways never before imagined. As a result, policymakers have begun to exhibit an unprecedented willingness to experiment with alternative institutional arrangements, governance structures, and regulatory paradigms.
I would like to explore the dimensions of the new policy alternatives being considered, paying particular attention to what the recent debates over new approaches to regulation and interagency governance have overlooked. A close examination reveals that, although these debates have reflected a number of interesting insights, they have yet to incorporate the full implications of the forces that are transforming the policy environment.
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My remarks will proceed as follows: Part I reviews the wealth of possible governance structures currently under discussion.
Part II will identify the two forces that I believe are primarily responsible for much of the new thinking about telecommunications regulation-specifically the advent of access regulation and the convergence of communications technologies-and explore how they have placed a newfound importance on considerations related to dynamic efficiency. This analysis sheds new light on the dangers associated with the continued application of old regulatory tools that are designed primarily to promote static efficiency and fail to pay sufficient attention to dynamic efficiency.
Part III examines how those same forces are revolutionizing the way telecommunications policy is being implemented. In particular, it explores how technological convergence and the shift towards access regulation is undercutting the traditional approach to setting regulatory rates. My analysis suggests that the same forces that are transforming the ends of telecommunications policy are exerting a fundamental transformation on the means employed as well.
Part IV looks beyond the current discussions to a future in which competing network platforms serve as complements rather than substitutes for one another and offers some initial thoughts about the regulatory changes that might be required.
I. AN UNPRECEDENTED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
In recent years, policymakers have evinced a greater willingness to experiment with alternative governance structures than has ever been seen before. One can easily identify at least six areas in which policymakers are actively reconsidering their basic substantive and institutional approach to regulation. A brief review of these proposals reveals just how much more wide open the policy space has become.
First, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recently attempted to offer a clearer delineation of the types of merger each agency would be responsible for reviewing for compliance with the antitrust laws. These two agencies have historically divided merger clearance responsibility on a case-by-case basis. This process has at times embroiled the two agencies in protracted turf battles, which in turn has created delays that increased the pressure placed on both the regulators and the merging parties. As a result, the American Bar Association and other professional organizations have long called upon the agencies to simplify the manner in which responsibility for merger clearances was assigned.
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The DOJ and the FTC jointly offered just such a proposal last year. The plan advanced by both agencies would circumvent bureaucratic infighting over particular mergers by dividing regulatory oversight responsibility on an industry-by-industry basis.
1 The effort collapsed in the face of the opposition of Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Ernest Hollings, who objected to the decision to allocate responsibility to review media-related mergers to the DOJ.
2 Now that control of the Senate has changed hands, it remains to be seen whether a similar proposal will resurface.
Second, policymakers have begun to debate whether to impose greater restrictions on the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC's) role in scrutinizing mergers in the communications industry. Unlike mergers in other industries, which are generally reviewed only by either the DOJ or the FTC, communications-related mergers must also go through an additional level of review by the FCC. 3 The dual nature of the review increases the costs of such mergers and extends the time needed to clear these mergers, which can be catastrophic in technologically dynamic industries.
In addition, the substantive principles applied by the FCC differ widely from those applied under conventional antitrust review. Under the approach taken by the DOJ and the FTC, the burden rests on the government to prove that the merger would harm competition. In addition, those agencies have jointly issued Merger Guidelines that offer a relatively clear description of how the competitive effects of mergers will be assessed. 4 FCC review, in contrast, is governed by the more amorphous "public interest" standard. 5 The FCC has offered relatively little advance guidance about what it believes the public interest standard requires. Over time, some details have become apparent. It is clear, for example, that the FCC places the burden of proof on the merging parties to show that the merger would affirmatively enhance competition. The effect is to raise a presumption against mergers, which in turn forecloses mergers whose competitive effects are either neutral or ambiguous. In addition, the FCC has made clear that it will block mergers based on far more speculative harms to potential competition than would be allowed under current antitrust law. The FCC's merger clearance process has also raised substantial procedural and process-oriented concerns. Specifically, the FCC has been able to use its role in clearing mergers to impose conditions on the merging parties. This has had the effect of turning merger review into a form of backdoor regulation that does not have to go through the regular process of notice and comment and may well be immune from judicial review.
Controversy over the manner in which the FCC was exercising its merger review authority has led Congress periodically to consider legislation that would either eliminate or severely restrict the FCC's authority to review mergers. 6 This, in turn, prompted the FCC to publish internal guidelines cabining its own discretion in an attempt to head off such criticism.
7 While apparently sufficient to quiet congressional concerns, the FCC's action has been less than completely effective in speeding up and rationalizing the FCC's merger review process. agencies applying their statutory mandates. 10 The courts of appeals have split over the issue, with some favoring the former 11 and others favoring the latter.
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Implicit in this debate are difficult questions about institutional capability and the procedural differences associated with each approach. It is an issue that will soon be addressed by the Supreme Court. 13 Fourth, even when an issue clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the agencies rather than courts, it still must be determined whether that jurisdiction should be exercised by federal or state authorities. The original division of responsibility established by the Communications Act of 1934 14 gave the FCC authority over all interstate communications, while according to the states exclusive jurisdiction over purely intrastate matters.
15 Enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 16 prompted an extended dispute between federal and state regulators that was ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court's recognition that the Act effected a fundamental shift of power towards the federal government and away from the states. 17 A parallel debate arose with respect to cable modem service, prompted by the attempt by municipal regulatory authorities to impose open access requirements either as a matter of direct regulation 18 or as a condition upon the transfer of licenses needed to consummate a merger. 19 Two courts of appeals have rejected the cities' authority to impose such requirements, holding that 22. Most notably, the FCC left it for state Public Utility Commissioners to decide whether failure to provide unbundled access to local switching would impair the ability of competing telecommunications carriers to provide the services that they seek to offer as required by 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2)(B). With respect to high-capacity lines used by businesses, the FCC entered a presumptive finding of no impairment and gave the PUCs ninety days to rebut that national finding. With respect to mass market (i.e., small business and residential) lines, the FCC entered no presumption and gave the PUCs nine months to determine whether economic and operational impairment exists in any particular market. More recently, the FCC has wavered in its certainty that such matters are best governed by federal regulators. For example, in clarifying the basis for its jurisdiction to regulate cable modem services, the FCC sought comment on whether it should forbear from displacing all state and municipal regulation. 21 The consensus in favor of federal regulatory jurisdiction received another jolt in the FCC's Triennial Review proceedings when the FCC decided to give the states a greater role in determining the scope of the unbundled access requirements of the 1996 Act. 22 The order in this proceeding was finally released as this symposium contribution was going to press. 23 Final resolution of this issue will have to wait until the courts finish with the judicial challenges to the FCC's actions. 24 Fifth, policymakers appear to be actively reconsidering the utility of many of the basic regulatory tools upon which they have relied for more than a century. The classic approach taken by regulatory authorities with respect to telecommunications networks has been to impose cost-of-service rate- making. This approach requires carriers to file tariffs with regulatory agencies. Once the authorities approve the tariff, the carriers must make their services available according to the terms of the tariff to all comers on a nondiscriminatory basis.
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Over time, the administrative process for submitting and approving tariffs has proven far too cumbersome to accommodate the more competitive environments that characterize modern telecommunications. In addition, carriers have proven quite adept at manipulating the tariff process for strategic purposes. 25 Tariffing also contradicts certain basic principles of consumer protection by sanctioning the displacement of any terms inconsistent with the tariff to which the parties may have agreed, even when the carrier intentionally misrepresents its rate and the customer relies upon the misrepresentation.
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As a result, policymakers have increasingly moved away from tariffs towards more flexible agreements negotiated on a customer-by-customer basis.
27 Even more fundamentally, regulators have increasingly begun to abandon classic rate regulation in favor of new approach known as "access regulation." 28 Rather than focusing on the rates that carriers charge end users for outputs, access regulation focuses on the terms and conditions under which competitors can purchase the right to use inputs.
Sixth, the growing convergence of telecommunications technologies has strengthened the arguments in favor of relying on markets as a governance mechanism. It is towards the confluence of and interaction between these last two developments that I would like to address the balance of my remarks.
II. ACCESS REGULATION, CONVERGENCE, AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY
It seems to me that the last two transformations that I have identified-the shift towards access regulation and the emergence of technological convergence-together have far greater implications for telecommunications policy than is generally appreciated. In particular, too little attention has been paid to the new emphasis that these two transformations have placed on considerations of dynamic efficiency.
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Before convergence, each mode of communication was available through only one means of transmission, and each means of transmission was considered a natural monopoly. The impossibility of sustainable competition from alternative facilities understandably led policymakers to direct their efforts towards allocating the existing facilities in the most efficient manner possible and to pay little attention to the impact that their regulatory decisions had on the incentives to invest in alternative network capacity. In other words, they focused on static efficiency, which adopts an ex post perspective that takes the existing distribution of goods as given, and ignores dynamic efficiency, which evaluates optimality on an ex ante basis and asks the logically prior question of which goods should be produced in the first place. Ignoring dynamic efficiency was reasonable when the underlying technologies remained natural monopolies and any attempt to foster competition would inevitably prove futile. It is less defensible in an era of technological convergence, in which the deployment of alternative network facilities represents a critical policy objective.
The tension between static and dynamic efficiency is well illustrated by the conundrum posed by access requirements. Under the conventional approach to competition policy, access requirements represent something of an anomaly. The fundamental problem posed in most access-related situations is monopoly control of a bottleneck facility. Under such circumstances, the most appropriate long-term solution is to break up control of the bottleneck either by forcing the existing player to divest part of its holdings or by cultivating the emergence of new entrants who will compete directly with bottleneck facility. Access remedies, in contrast, simply force bottleneck owners to share their monopolies without breaking them up. Such a result might be justified when an industry is truly a natural monopoly and there is no viable prospect that any degree of competition would be sustainable. The propriety of access remedies changes radically after the emergence of alternative network facilities becomes technologically and economically feasible. When sustainable competition is possible, access regimes harm dynamic efficiency in two distinct ways. First, it is now well recognized that resources are most likely to receive the appropriate level of conservation and investment if they are protected by well-defined property rights. 30 Since any benefits gained from investments in capital or research must be shared with competitors, forcing a monopolist to share its resources reduces incentives to improve their facilities and pursue technological innovation.
Second, compelling access to an input also discourages investment by competitors by rescuing firms that need the input from having to invest in alternative sources of supply. In other words, forcing carriers to share their networks cuts off those who would like to construct alternative network facilities from their natural strategic partners. Access can thus preempt the emergence of a viable alternative to the bottleneck facility that represents the best long-run solution to the bottleneck problem. Quite the contrary, access remedies can have the perverse effect of cementing the existing monopoly into place. This is particularly true in technologically dynamic industries, in which the prospects of developing new ways either to circumvent or to compete directly with the bottleneck are the highest. The inevitable lag in adjusting regulation also raises the risk that regulations, such as access, that protect incumbents from new entry will continue to exist long after the justifications for enacting the regulation have long disappeared. investing in their networks, it has also rescued new entrants from having to invest in their own facilities. 33 Put in terms of the ongoing debate about open access that is taking place in the cable broadband proceedings, the real problem is not that consumers lack sufficient choice in terms of internet service providers (ISPs). Indeed, most can reach their desired web portal simply by clicking through to another address or by resetting their default home page to another website. The real problem is the lack of choice in last-mile broadband providers. Most households can only choose between their local cable operator and local telephone company. This underlying problem will remain regardless of whether consumers can choose among multiple ISPs or not. Mandating open access would thus amount to little more than simply rearranging the deck chairs on the Titannic.
The best long-run solution would be to stimulate the build-out of alternative broadband platforms. Indeed, satellite broadband, fixed wireless technologies, and third-generation mobile wireless devices (3G) each hold considerable promise to diversify our broadband choices. The problem is that deployment of each these technologies will require significant capital investments. The logical strategic partners to help finance such investments are those ISPs and other content providers who are unable to obtain the access to existing broadband networks. Mandating such access would obviate their need to undertake such risks. While the elimination of the need to make such investments would doubtlessly be beneficial to those ISPs, it is far from clear how consumers would benefit from such an outcome. It may seem counterintuitive, but the best way to maximize choice in the long run may well be to limit the number of choices in the short run. Such is the nature of the interrelationship between dynamic and static efficiency.
The implications of this line of reasoning are clear. Technological convergence appears to have eviscerated the factual preconditions needed to justify imposing access requirements. Although compelling access may make sense when an input is not available from any other source, it makes no sense in a convergent world in which alternative sources of supply are feasible. The fact that generating alterative sources of supply may be costly and may take a long time does not change the analysis. If the choice is between "some time in the far future" and "never," the former is still the better alternative. The inherent tension between access requirements and dynamic efficiency represents one of the central weaknesses of any access-oriented regulatory regime. If access prices are set too low, the imposition of an access regime will forestall the emergence of platform competition, as every potential entrant will find it more profitable to borrow parts of the incumbent's network rather than to build its own. It will also discourage the incumbent from making any investments in its network. The net result is an inevitable degradation of our communications infrastructure. Setting access prices too high, on the other hand, will render access remedies completely useless. Regulators implementing access regimes find themselves caught in a somewhat intractable position.
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Perhaps the greatest irony is that practical considerations may render the debates about the relative policy or impolicy of access regimes largely moot. Because the owner of the input has no real motivation to provide access to its competitors, it is common for interconnection agreements to become bogged down in incessant arguments about the reasonableness of the terms and conditions of access. It is thus arguable that access is destined to prove ineffectual as a remedy regardless of whether access is compelled or not. 35 The FCC's history with policing access regimes provides ample reason to suspect that the debates about access may ultimately prove to be much ado about nothing. 36 
III. CONVERGENCE AND REGULATORY PRICING
In addition to effect that the emergence of access regulation and technological convergence has had on the goals of telecommunications policy, federal and state regulators have failed to appreciate the full implications that
